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THE SCHWEGMANN CASE AND FAIR TRADE:
AN OBITUARY?
FAmr Trade aims to safeguard traditional distribution patterns and protect
producer brand names in consumer eyes. Chain, department and cut-rate
stores, employing vigorous price competition, early threatened traditional
distributors' established profit margins.' Loss-leader merchandising in nation-
ally advertised products tarnished their consumer acceptance and discouraged
other retailers from pushing the price-cut wares.' Worsted in the economic
1. See ZoR & FELnmir, Busrmsms UNDER THE Nnw PRicE L. ws 7-22 (1937)
(hereinafter cited as ZonRx & FELatAN). Department stores, mail order houses, chain
stores and smaller "cut rate" outlets commenced operations at the turn of the century
and achieved relative strength with increase in consumer mobility during the 1920's.
Employing limited service, leader selling and geographic price discrimination as sales
tactics and generally able to undersell smaller outlets because of purchasing advantages,
advertising and economies of scale, they threatened the traditional distributor. See
GErHER, PRICE CONrOL UNDER FAiR Tnuun LEIslATION 225-55 (1939) (hereinafter
cited as GarrEa); FTC, FiNA. RE'oRT ON THE CHAIN STRE IVrSTIGATION (1934)
for a study of the growth, and prediction as to the future, of chain stores. The
FTC felt the growth of chains "uncheckable." Id. at 86-7.
The legislation described in this comment may have slowed down the growth of
chains and large distributors. Between 1920 and 1930, chains more than tripled their
outlets. ZouR & FEL-mN at 7-8, 20 (1937). But from 1929 to 1939 growth was slow.
Chains did 20.3% of the total retail business in 1929 and 21.71 in 1939. In the retail
food trade, chains did 45.7% in 1929 and 32.4% in 1939; in drugs, Z38c in 1935 and
27.1% in 1939. STOCING & WNATKINS, MONorOLY AND Fron E:..TrMisn 4-9 (1951).
(hereinafter cited as STocKiNG & VATKs). For a collection of general statistics of
chains in the various distributive fields, see BOwMAN & BAcH, EcoNOMIC ArLALYSIS ANM
PuBic Poucy 834 (1946).
"It is recognized now, of course, that these newer types on the whole introduced
healthy competitive influences into the business of retailing." Gnrnni at 229.
2. Leader selling is the use of spectacular price cuts on merchandise as bait to attract
customers. Since price comparisons on nationally advertised products are readily made
by consumers, these are the products typically cut. Loss-leader selling generally signifies
that the price cut has carried below invoice cost. Consult Comment, 57 Ytu.u L.J. 391
(1948). ZoRN & F~mmnAN at 265-74; Grether, Experience in Calif o:ia 7,L'th Fair Trade
Legislation Restricting Price Cutting, 24 CALM. L. REv. 640 (1936). For a more detailed
theoretical analysis, see GRarHE at 199-224; Mu.iLR, UNAm Co.m'rrxoN 249-57
(1941) (hereinafter cited as MILmLm).
Producers claimed that wildly disparate prices on an item destroyed consumer faith
in its quality. And they feared that retailers would refrain from handling items that
were price cut so frequently as to destroy profit in handling them. See 2 CCH TRADE
Rm. REP. ff 7052; WE-iGE, THE FAmi TpuE AcTs 11-17 (1938). The Supreme Court
at one time accepted this argument. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers
Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 193 (1936) ("The primary aim of the law is to protect the property
-namely, the good will--of the producer, which he still owns. The price restriction is
adopted as an appropriate means to that perfectly legitimate end, and not as an end in
itself.").
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struggle, traditional wholesalers and retailers organized and sought legislative
help.3
Beginning in the 1930's, states enacted Fair Trade laws legalizing pro-
ducers' resale price maintenance.4 Producers thus could contractually bind
distributors not to resell below producer-set minimum resale prices 5 on
branded goods sold in competition with merchandise of the same general
class.6 But since the first Fair Trade laws bound only the contracting parties,"
non-signing distributors' price cutting often thwarted price stabilization
efforts.$ Many retailers would not sign. And refusals to sell to recalcitrant
3. The initial drive to effect legal resale price maintenance and preserve traditional
distribution channels came from manufacturers' groups. As chains became a substantial
market, moving large volumes and capable of using private brands to counter fixed prices,
manufacturer interest declined. But the movement was carried on with vigor by small
retailers and their wholesalers. STOCKING & WATKINS at 328-29; ZORN & FELD.MAN at
275-96; FTC, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE, 5, 52-6, 87 et seq., 847 et seq.
(1945) (hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT). GRETHnR at 8; CovER, PRom.mms ov SmALL
BUSINESS 163, 189 (TNEC Monograph 17, 1941).
4. The earliest statute resembling modern Fair Trade was the New Jersey "Notice"
Act of 1916 providing:
"It shall be unlawful for any merchant, firm, or corporation to appropriate for
his or their own use a name, brand, trade-mark, reputation, or goodwill of any
maker in whose product said merchant, firm, or corporation deals, or to discrim-
inate against the same by depreciating the value of such products in the public
mind, or by misrepresentation as to value or quality, or by price inducement, or
by unfair discrimination between buyers, or in any other manner whatsoever,
except in cases where said goods do not carry any notice prohibiting such
practice. .. "
FTC REPORT at 67; GRrHER at 14, 56.
Modern Fair Trade dates from the California Law of 1931 which permitted trade-
mark owners to establish resale prices by contract on items in "fair and open" competi-
tion with products of the same class. Sales closing out stocks, of damaged goods, and
by court officers were exempted. GRlTHER at 17-21; see FTC REORT at 67-87 for analy-
sis of the early California Act and history of Fair Trade legislation.
5. Some state statutes legalize the fixing of absolute in addition to minimum resale
prices. See note 81 infra.
6. See note 15 infra.
7. The original California Act of 1931 lacked nonsigner provisions. Failure of the
act to achieve its goal led to its amendment in 1933:
"Willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity
at less than the price stipdated in any contract entered into pursuant to the pro-
visions of Section 1 of this Act, whether the person so advertising, offering for
sale, or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair competition and is
actionable at the suit of any person aggrieved thereby." (Emphasis added,) Re-
printed in WEIGEL, THE FAno TRADE AcTs 36 (1938),
Present nonsigtier provisions are substantially identical in all states. See 2 CCH TRADE.
REG. REP. 18004 et seq.; WEIGEL, supra at 36-60.
8. See WEIGEL, THE FAIR TRADE Acrs'35 (1938). "The great majority of druggists
gladly signed the price maintenance contracts. But the cut-rate druggists refused to do
so." Ibid.
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retailers were often fruitless, since price cutters surreptitiously obtained sup-
plies from "signing" outlets eager to turn an arbitrage profit. 9 Moreover,
refusals to sell might well isolate producers from access to increasingly dom-
inant mass-selling outlets.'0 Since resale price maintenance enforceable only
against contracting parties proved ineffective, later Fair Trade laws bound
all distributors not to undercut knowingly the price stipulated in a Fair Trade
contract with any distributive outlet."' These "non-signer" clauses, early
upheld against due process challenge,': became the prime tool of state-
sanctioned Fair Trade.'
3
To insulate Fair Trade from the federal antitrust laws' ban on
9. Cf. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911);
Cat's Paw Rubber Co. v. Barlo Leather Co., CCH TRAm REG. Rm,. '43-'51 DE.- 1 62,949
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
10. "Perhaps most of [a manufacturer's] merchandise still goes through whole-
salers and small independent retailers, but in view of the increasing importance of
chains he will cut himself off from too large a part of his consumer market if he does
not sell some of his goods through them; and, looking to the future, he does not dare
place sole reliance on a single channel of distribution which may conceivably dwindle
and dry up." McNair, Markethig Functions and Costs and The Robinson-Patfrnan Act,
4 L. w & Co-rmn. PaoB. 334,346 (1937).
11. See note 7 supra. Every state except Missouri, Texas, and Vermont and the
District of Columbia enacted Fair Trade laws between 1931 and 1950. 2 CCH TnArz
R G. REP. 17011 (1951). See id. at 18004 et seq. for texts of all state statutes. The
laws are of two types: early laws follow the California model; later laws, such as the
Connecticut statute, copy the National Association of Retail Druggists model. Zo.; &
FELDmAN at 297.
All laws are similar in their basic legalization of resale price maintenance contracts
and coercion on non-signers. They differ on such details as whether wholeslers may
establish Fair Trade and whether absolute as well as minimum prices may be contracted.
In the District of Columbia the Federal Trade Commission is currently engaged in
prosecuting Fair Trade as an "unfair trade practice" violating Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. 20 U.S.L VEr 2264 (Dec. 29, 1951); 18 U.S.L. WEEX 2303
(Jan. 17, 1950).
Florida's Fair Trade law has twice been declared unconstitutional. Bristol-Myers
Co. v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 137 Fla. 503, 183 So. 91 (1939) (defective legislative
title in that it failed to describe the nonsigner provision) ; Liquor Store v. Continental
Distilling Corp., 40 So2d 371 (Fla. 1949) (emergency legislation; the emergency has
ended.) See Comment, 7 WAsH. & LEa L REv. 28 (1950). The new Florida Fair Trade
law, FL.A. Strr. A N. § 541.001 et seq. (Supp. 1950) has recently had its nonsigner
provisions sheared out by the Florida Supreme Court. See note 87 infra.
12. E.g., Seagram Corp. v. Old Dearborn Corp., 363 I11. 610, 2 N.E2d 940
(1936), aff'd, 299 U.S. 183 (1936). But cf. Doubleday, Doran v. Macy & Co. 269
N.Y. 272, 199 N.E. 409 (1936).
13. WmGEL, THE FAIR T aAE Acrs 36 (193); Gpzrnm, at 18; FTC IRrowr
at 74. Not only the producer, but individual retailers may enforce against non-
signers, Port Chester Wine and Liquor Shop v. Miller Bros. Inc., 281 N.Y. 101,
22 N.E.2d 253 (1939); even where the suing retailer is himself a nonsigner,
Calamia v. Goldsmith Brothers, 299 N.Y. 636, 795, 87 N.E.2d 50, 6S7 (1949); and
an association of retailers has been permitted to sue as representative of injured
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price fixing agreements, Congress in 1937 passed the Miller-Tydings
amendment to the Sherman Act.' 4 Carving an exception out of Section 1 of
the Act, Miller-Tydings exempted "contracts or agreements" to maintain
retailers, Iowa Pharmaceutical Association v. May's Drug Stores Inc., 229 Iowa
554, 294 N.W. 756 (1940).
See Comment, 36 CoRN L. Q. 781, 785 (1951) for an excellent analysis of the
essentials of a cause of action and defenses thereto under various Fair Trade
statutes. Giving trading stamps as a blanket reduction on the price of all items, in.
cluding Fair Trade products, may be considered price cutting. Bristol-Myers Co.
v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E. 2d 177 (1950); but see Weco Products Co. v. Mid-
City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App.2d 684, 131 P2d 856 (1942). See
generally Note, 64 HARv. L. Rlv. 1327, 1332-3 (1951). Fair Trade acts in 20 states
specifically forbid giving trading stamps with purchases of Fair Trade items. Ibid.
14. The Miller-Tydings resale price maintenance act, 50 STAT 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1946), was enacted in 1937 as an amendment to Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Taking the form of a proviso in Section 1
of the Sherman Act it states:
"Provided, that nothing herein contained shall render illegal, contracts or agree-
ments prescribing minimum prices for the resale of a commodity which bears ...
the trade mark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such commodity
and which is in free and open competition with commodities of the same general
class produced or distributed by others, when contracts of agreements of that
description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions, under any statute,
law or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory or the
District of Columbia in which such resale is to be made, or to which the coin-
modity is to be transported for such resale, and the making of such contracts
or agreements shall not be an unfair method of competition under section 5, as
amended and supplemented, of the Act entitled "An Act to create a Federal
Trade Commission, ...
Provided further, that the preceding proviso shall not make lawful any
contract or agreement, providing for the establishment or maintenance of
minimum resale prices on any commodity herein involved, between manu.
facturers, or between producers, or between wholesalers, or between brokers
or between factors, or between retailers or between persons, firms or corpora-
tions in competition with each other. .. ."
Prior to the amendment, resale price maintenance in interstate commerce was
illegal under antitrust law. Early lower court cases had held resale price mainten-
ance contracts valid for articles made by secret process. E.g., Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. Goldthwaite, 133 Fed. 794 (C.C.N.D. Mass. 1904). However the tide soon
turned. A similar system was held illegal in Park and Sons v. Hartman, 153 Fed,
24 (6th Cir. 1907). Finally in 1911, the Supreme Court, ruling on a like system in
the form of agency contracts, held the Sherman Act to forbid contractual resale price
maintenance. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park and Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (suit
for inducing breach of producer-distributor contract to maintain resale prices does
not lie because contract illegal). See also Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 US. 339
(1908) (copyright owner does not have a fight to fix resale prices on books);
Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918) (patent
holders may not fix resale prices by contract). And compare United States v. Gen-
eral Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), with United States v. Masonite Corp., 316
U.S. 265 (1942) for decreasing possibility of legal resale price fixing by establish-
ing resellers as agents of the producer.
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minimum resale prices when sanctioned by state law.15 But State Fair Trade
devices, such as non-signer clauses, were unmentioned in the Congres-
sional enactment. A proviso, however, specifically withheld Congressional
approval from horizontal price-fixing between competitors on the same distri-
butive level.'"
15. See statutory text, note 14 supra. Miller-Tydings reiterated the typical pro-
vision under state statutes, requiring Fair Traded products to be in "fair and open
competition" with goods of the same general class. E.g. statutes of California and
Connecticut.
During Congressional debate, Senator Tydings thought this limitation "mountain-
high." 81 CoNG. Run. 7495 (1937). "There are on the market 25 or 30 varieties of
tooth paste. Under the amendment, manufacturers may not combine with each other
for the purpose of price maintenance; but if a manufacturer wishes to say that
his particular kind of tooth paste may not be sold by a retailer at less than a certain
minimum price, and that minimum price is high, other tooth paste manufacturers
will come in and take his business." Ibid. But the mountain has thus far brought
forth a mouse. Apparently only one case has rested on this limitation to deny Miller-
Tydings protection to a Fair Trade arrangement. Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 153
F2d 592 (2d Cir. 1946), cert denied, 330 U.S. 828 (1947). Cf. Missouri cx rel Taylor v.
Anderson, CCH TsAmE REG. REP. '48"50 Dec. ff 67, 205 (Mo. 1952) (conspiracy to fix
resale price of liquid petroleum illegal under state antitrust laws).
The requisite competition was found though plaintiff's tooth brushes .%ere the
only Nylon brushes that could be purchased, WVeco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut
Rate Drug Stores, 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 7174 (Cal. Super. 1940); or plaintiff's
stockings had a patented design, Glen Raven Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Sanson Hosiery
Mills Inc., 189 F2d 845 (4th Cir. 1951). Competition v'as held to exist among
copyrighted books, Schill v. Remington Putnam 17 A.2d 175 (Md. 1941); and
among phonograph records of different compositions by different artists, Columbia
Records, Inc. v. Goody, 278 App. Div. 401, 105 N.Y.S2d 659 (1951), rcversing CCH TLunz
REG. REP. '48-51 Dec. ff 62,732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Special Term 1950). But cf. Schnid,
Inc. v. McKay, 1948-1949 TRADE CASES ff 62309 (Okla. Dist. 1949). oMrcover, one state
court has interpreted "Fair" to rule out Fair Trade for a producer who did not interfere
with retailers' cutting prices at will. Schenley Distributors v. H. Hollander Co., 2 CCH
TpuAE REG. REP. f1 25545 (Mass. Super. 1940). See Rahl, Resale Price Maintenance,
State Action, and the Antitrust Laws: Effect of Schwegmaim Brothers v. Calvert Distillers
Corp., 46 ILu. L. REv. 349, 374-5 (1951), for discussion of the possible conflict in the
statutes' dual requirement of "fair" and "free."
16. See statutory text, note 14 supra. Distributors combining with producers to force
other dealers into Fair Trade arrangements were held to violate the Sherman Act, the Court
in part resting on the rationale of the "horizontal" proviso. United States v. Frankfort
Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 296-7 (1945). The proviso withheld Miller-Tydings
protection from retailers agreeing among themselves on price-fidng. United States v.
Greater Kansas City Retail Coal Merchants' Ass'n., 85 F. Supp. 503 (D.C. Mo. 1949);
Cf. California Retail Grocers & Merchants Ass'n v. U.S., 139 F. 2d 978 (9th Cir. 1943),
cert denied, 322 U.S. 729 (1944). Similar agreements among wholesalers and retailers
were also illegal. Pazen v. Silver Rod Stores, Inc., 130 N.J. Eq. 407, 22 A.2d 237 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1941). And a producer could not cooperate with wholesalers and retailers
to fix minimum resale prices on both distributive levels. United States v. Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), modified, 321 U.S. 707 (1944)
("the system ...created not only a perpendicular system of control but, in addition,
two horizontal systems, one involving competing wholesalers and the other competing
retailers").
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ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF FAIR TRADE 17
Pressures in the Distribution Process
Traditionally, three distinct economic groups function within distributive
channels.' 8 Producers vie for favorable distributive outlets to the consumer.
19
Wholesalers perform middleman, storage, and distribution functions and sell
the outputs of rival producers to retailers. 20 And retailers in turn compete with
each other, offering as attractions to the consumer their own services and
the outputs of various producers. 2'
Nationally advertised products are traditionally distributed with little
price competition.22 Producers through brand labels and advertising differ-
entiate themselves from their competitors, and build consumer preference
margins for their own wares.23 Typically they merchandise through whole-
17. Consult generally MILLER at 230-66; STOCKING & WATKINS at 321-30; EDWARDS,
MAINTAINING Co PrIIo 66-73 (1949); FTC REPORT passim; GRETnER passin.
18. For excellent analyses of the traditional tripartite system of distribution and the
impact of new methods of selling see Fulda, Food Distribution in the United States, 99
U. OF PENN. L. REv. 1051 (1951); ZORN & FELDMAN at 3-27; STocKING & WATKINS at
316-33. For a particularly embittered picture of the traditional system, consult SnioNS,
EcoNomc POLICY FOR A FREE SoclEY 71 (1948): "[E]very producer must bribe mer-
chants into pushing his product, by providing fantastic 'mark-ups,' merely because other
producers are doing the same thing. Consumers must be prohibited access to wholesale
markets and prices in order to protect the 'racket' of retailers whose co-operation the
individual producer requires; and there follows inevitably the absurd proliferation of
small retail establishments which spring up to exact on small volumes of trade the large
percentage tribute existing arrangements allow to those who can classify as dealers rather
than as consumers. There appears to be no significant limit ... to the potential accumu-
lation of economic waste."
19. "The manufacturer must be as attentive to winning their favor as to winning
that of consumers through direct advertising. Especially must the price of the product
be high enough to reward adequately, even generously, all those who control distributive
outlets." CHm'TBERtIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOUSTIC COMPErITION 122 (5th ed.
1946) (hereinafter cited as CHAMBERLIN). See, generally, id at 118-23. A manufacturer's
forward integration into distribution obviates this necessity. But only makers of goods
that can support separate retail outlets can afford this.
20. See e.g., ZORN & FELDMAN at 3-5, Fulda, supra note 18 at 1054-55.
21. For discussion of retailers' pricing of goods and services, consult Miu.am at
246-49.
22. See note 18 supra; Adelman, Effective Competition and The Antitrust Laws, 61
HAav. L. REv. 1289, 1296-1301 (1948). Cf. American Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 804 (1945).
23. "The imperfection of competition among manufacturers rests largely upon the
use of advertising to break up the market into a series of submarkets." Burns, Anti.
Trust Laws and Regulation of Price Competition, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 301, 306
(1937) ; "If one can succeed in persuading the public that his goods are really unique,
obviously he becomes their only supplier." Adelman, supra note 21 at 1299. See generally
Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest; Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57
YAr.Z L.J. 1165 (1948). Consult CHAMBERLIN at 115-29 for a theoretical analysis of the
results of competitive advertising. Cf. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 796, 805-8 (1946) (advertising permitted three cent differential between defendants'
cigarettes and minor brands.)
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salers who buy in bulk at a functional discount -4 and resell to retailers
in smaller lots. And to maintain wholesaler goodwill, manufacturers may
refuse to sell at wholesale prices even to retailers able to buy in wholesale
lots. 25 Wholesalers often act as exclusive territorial agents for a product
and thus meet no price competition in that brand.20 Even where many
wholesalers distribute one branded product, competition concentrates on
services and location rather than price.2 7  To avoid retailer disaffection,
wholesalers in turn refrain from direct sales to consumers. And a multitude
of small retailers, usually weak in bargaining power, purchases stock from
wholesalers at inflexible prices and sells at a percentage mark-up of cost.2 8
In sum, price competition is meager; location, services and personal con-
tact count.
29
But mass-distribution pays. Large retail sales mean large purchases
from suppliers, enabling retailers to squeeze price concessions from middle-
men or producers.30 And if concessions are not forthcoming, giant retailers
24. "The seller's schedule fixes discounts from quoted price to buyers classified
according to rank on the distribution ladder. Typical systems allow reductions to whole-
salers, jobbers, and retailers in decreasing amounts, regardless of size of individual
transaction or aggregate sales volume. A wholesaler may buy 10 units during one year.
But a retailer who buys 100 units each month must pay the higher price." Rowe, Price
Discrimination, Competition and Contfusion 60 YALE L.J. 929, 932 (1951). This discount
structure is a major support for the traditional wholesaler. One economist characterized
it as "a vestigial remainder of the mercantilist system (as a collos.al system Lf restraint
upon trade)." Snioxs, Ecoxomc PoucY FOR A FREm Socar= 72 (1943).
25. See ZoRN & FmmAux at 6. Cf. Great A & P Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co.,
227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir. 1915).
26. Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1122-3 (1949).
27. E.g., Cassady & Jones, The Los Angeles Wholesale Grocery Structure: 1920-46:
A Case Study, 14 J. MAnx'IxG 169, 170 (1949).
28. Cf. Hawkins, Marketing and the Theory of Monopolistic Conipelifion, 4 J.
MARKMING 382 (1940).
29. "In general, the smaller independent stores are serzice institutions. Since price
appeal is normally not their policy, attention can be given to such things as the customer
preference as to the thickness of steak, the flavor of ice cream, or the brand of cigar
which he prefers." A-AYNARD & BECKM21A N, PRINCIPL.s or MATKET-NG 130 (4th Ed.
1946). See also GRnr= at 232-3.
30. FEDERAL TRADE CoMISSION, FINAL RmoRT ON THE CH.uN STORE INVESTIGAVTON
57-8 (1934). "These concessions take various forms. Where terms are secret, no problem
is presented. However, some producers who maintain an open-price policy consider it
advisable to conceal the extent of these concessions, in order to avoid too loud a protest
from wholesalers. Special discounts take the form of divers 'allowances: Sometimes a
distributor is granted brokerage for placing his own order. Occasionally a subsidiary
corporation is organized and collects brokerage for selling to its parent company. In
each case, however, it is the differential itself, rather than its nominal justification which
is significant" ZoRN & FELDMAN at 12. See generally, id at 11. Cf. United States v. Great
A & P Co., 173 F. 2d 79, 83-7 (7th Cir. 1949).
The Robinson-Patnoan Anti-Price Discrimination Act, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1946) was directed at precisely this practice. See Rowe, supra note 24, at 929-30.
For recent full discussion of the economic basis and legal effects of the statute, see ibid,
passim. When an illegal price concession is granted, both seller and buyer violate the
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may threaten forays into the middleman or production field.3 1 Moreover,
mass retailing permits the spreading of managerial and handling costs.3 2
Again, minimization of incidental retail services permits additional price
cuts on the retail level.33 Finally, volume sales sustain expensive adver-
tising campaigns 34 and permit spectacular price cuts on popular items.33
Such price-cutting benefits diversified merchandisers,30 using loss-leaders
in one department as bait for other high-profit sales. As a result, tradition-
al retailers face unprecedented competitive pressures81
Act. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) (seller); Automatic Canteen Co.
v. FTC, 20 U.S.L. W=nK 2320 (7th Cir. Jan. 29, 1952) (buyer). Moreover, both parties
may be held liable for treble damages at the instance of injured parties. See cases cited
in Rowe, supra note 24, at 941 n.73, 958 n.198, 961 n.210.
31. For example, see Adelman's short history: "The profits of Ralston-Purina
Company on sales to A & P were very large. There were only two other firms who
manufactured corn flakes for private label, and it is easy to imagine that buyers may
be over a barrel when there are only three sellers in the market. But A & P drew
Ralston's attention to the fourth alternative of manufacturing for itself, and consequently
received a cheaper price." Adelman, The A & P case, A Study in applied Ecolnoillic
Theory, 63 Q. J. EcoN. 238, 254 (1949). And see id. at 247-48; STocniNG & WATnwS
at 327-9.
32. "Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of the corporate chains is the
economy achieved (a) through mass volume and centralized management at the retail
level and (b) through integration of wholesaling, retailing, and, in many cases, mau-i
facturing operation." Fulda, supra note 18, at 1056 et seq.
33. The culmination of the limited service trend is the self-service, cash-and-carry
supermarket. See ZORN & FELDMAN at 8-9.
34. Volume sellers are at a comparative advantage in advertising techniques over
small individual retailers. FTC, INvEsTiGATioN OF CHAiN STOR ADvERTISmNa 48 (1934),
and passim. This advantage is often enlarged by squeezing added advertising allowance
from manufacturers. E.g. Fulda, supra note 18, at 1084-94; FTC, R'oR, oN DISTRtwu-
TION METHODS AND COSTS Part V p. 19 (1944). However, organized small retailers
have been able to counter-attack with cooperative advertising ventures. Ibid,
35. See notes 2 supra, 36 in!ra.
36. Leader selling is a function of diversification rather than size, EDWARDS, MAIN-
TAINING ComPE.n' oN 68 (1949). The leader is generally a widely known medium.
priced item, with a fast turnover and of a type making it unprofitable fdr consumers to
hoard it. GiurEza at 199-224. It acts as an advertising medium for the retail store,
drawing in customers on the basis of quick price comparisons on popular items. EDWARDS,
supra, at 68-9; Burns, supra note 23, at 308. "The small concern can match the large one
more readily in such tactics than in display advertising, radio advertising and various
other forms of promotion." EDWARDS, supra, at 68. For economic analysis of the effects
of leader selling, see MIuTm at 249-57.
37. Small retailers often blame their heavy bankruptcy incidence on chain store
competition. Cova, PROBLEMS OF SMALL BusiNrss 122-3 (TNEC Monograph No. 17,
1941). The Senate Select Committee on Small Business recently reported: "The memory
of the early Nineteen Thirties and the great number of small independent concerns
that were then lost to the economy directly as a result of ... price wars is still fresh."
N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1952, § 3, p. 9, col. 3. But "most of the failures occurred to marginal
firms, parasitic in nature, which could remain in business only so long as not challenged
by pressure of economic forces or of modern business methods." CovEa, supra at 122.
4 Hearings before the Special Committee on Investigation American Retail Federation
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 261 (Rev. Print) (1936); Fulda, supra note 18 at 1073.
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Modem distribution methods also endanger orthodox wholesalers. Retail
price cutters, upsetting stable pricing patterns, may set off chain reactions
leading other retailers to pressure price reductions from wholesalers. 3
And large retailers may integrate backward, adding middleman functions
to their retail selling. Thus they may buy directly from producers, easing
wholesalers from substantial markets.39  Moreover, integrated retail-
wholesale distributors may branch out to supply non-integrated retailers,
directly usurping independent wholesalers' markets., And integrated re-
tailers, by partially eliminating one level of costs are further enabled to cut
prices at retail,41 increasing other retailers' pressure on their suppliers. Final-
ly some middlemen, basing operations upon limited service and performing
merely brokerage functions, emerge as price cutters at the wholesale level. 2
38. Wholesaler reaction to these pressures varied, but many wholesalers allowed
their small customers an extra 10% discount on the purchase of certain types of merchan-
dise to aid them in meeting competition. FTC REPr at 205-12. After legalization of
Fair Trade, the discounts were ithdrawn. Ibid, Grur.m at 293.
Wholesalers were "[r]aked by the cross-fires of direct-selling manufacturers on
the one flank, and direct-buying retailers on the other." CovsE, op. cit. supra note 37,
at 163. And see id at 161-63, 169. "Not only were these large retailers permitted to buy
drect from producers; they were often able to secure more favorable terms than any
wholesaler!' Zorr & FELmIAN at 11. See generally, Edmunds, In Wlwlesaling's Future
-The Coming Aterica, 14 J. MARKEING 267 (1949). Wholesalers attempted counter-
pressure, by boycotting producers who sold directly to chain retailers, United States v.
Southern California Wholesale Grocers Ass'n., 7 F2d 944 (S. D. Cal. 1925) (group boycott
enjoined as violating Sherman Act); but cf. FTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 2i3 U.S.
565 (1924) (individual wholesaler's refusal to buy upheld), or by forming "voluntary
chains" of their own; or they gathered a group of retailers around themselves as guar-
anteed purchasers of general and private brand itens. MAYNAnD & BErutiz, op. it.
szpra note 29 at 194-201.
40. Cf. the operations of ACCO, A & P's buying subsidary. United States v. A & P
Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79, 85 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Note, 58 Y,-n L. J. 969, 972 (1949).
41. For analysis of the economies of integration, see Adelman, Intcgration and Anti-
trust Policy, 63 HARv. L. Rv. 27, 29 (1949) ("When integration pays, the saving is
essentially in the cost of transfer. Raw materials or supplies may be conserved. Or it
may be possible to by-pass certain steps in distribution, thereby saving the cost of services
no longer needed."). Further cost savings growing out of integration are explained in
Spengler, Vertical Integration, 58 J. Poi- Ecox. 347 (1951). Spengler postulates that
vertical integration that avoids dealing with outsiders who are monopolistically organ-
ized at any stage of distribution enables the firm to short-circuit a monopoly surcharge
and thus charge a lower price to the consumer. See generally, McNair, supra note 10;
Cassidy, The Integrated Marketing Function and Public Welfare, 6 J. 3 ,uu-ni 252,
255-9 (1942).
42. See Zoan & FExmAN at 22-3, 31-3, 184; FTC Rns'ma at 9-10. For a survey of
the varied types of middlemen functioning today, see MnAYNr, & BE=Lw, op. cit.
.supra note 29, at 246-8, 283-300.
See Southern Hardwrare Jobbers Ass'n v. FTC, 290 Fed. 773 (5th Cir. 1923) (hard-
ware jobbers' association violates FTC Act by boycott of manufacturers to squeeze
"irregular" jobbers from supplies) ; Arkansas Wholesale Grocers Ass'n v. FTC, 1S F2d
866 (8th Cir. 1927) (wholesale grocers' association ordered to cease boycott of manu-
facturers, aimed "especially" at freezing "co-operative" wholesalers from supplies).
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Iass distribution also pressures producers. Where few producers compose
a market, price competition may seem unprofitable. 43 If their wares form a
stable segment of the buyer's consumption, price reductions in such relatively
inelastic markets may not spur a proportionate rise in sales.44 And since even
an individual producer's differentiation of his product cannot completely isolate
him from his rivals' price policies, 45 individual price cuts tend to be followed
by all. As a consequence, the individual producer's market share may be left
unchanged. Because of the price reductions, however, his total returns are
diminished. Therefore producers' price policies, because mutually interde-
pendent, are geared away from price reductions dangerous to all. A pattern
of inflexible pricing results. But price cuts on the wholesale or retail level jar
the orderly price structure of producers. Producers may attribute price cuts
anywhere in distribution channels to secret price concessions by their rivals,40
and make compensating price drops to retain market shares. Moreover, mass
distributors make powerful bargainers, capable of directly exacting price con-
cessions by threats of taking their business elsewhere or of fostering their own
brands.47 And any concessions made not only may force down the price level
of all producers, but encourage demands by other buyers for lower rates.
Finally, a producer's sales to price-cutting merchants may provoke other re-
tailers to shun his wares. Producers thus have a stake in stifling competition
on the retail and wholesale levels.
43. For economic treatments of price policies in markets dominated by a few large
sellers, i.e., oligopolies, consult CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC Coml'rl-
TION (5th ed. 1946); RoBINsON, THE EcoNOMIcs OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933);
FmLNER, CoMPmmoTIoN AMOZNG THE FEW (1949). For an excellent concise analysis of
the folly of price cutting by oligopolists in the cement industry, see Comment, 58 YALE L.J.
426, 432, 433 (1949) ("In short, price competition in this type of market becomes financial
disaster.") ; Rowe, supra note 24, at 939 ("In such markets price competition is vermin,
and sellers readily cooperate to stamp it out."). See generally MILLER, at 186-8 (1941);
STOCKING & WATKINS at 85-131; and, on a more technical level, see STIGLER, THE TIIEROV
OF PRIcE 197-302 (1947) ; BAIN, PRICING, DISTRIBUmON AND EMPLOYMENT 176-221 (1948).
44. BOWMAN & BACH, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC PoLIcY 267-77 (2d ed.
1949).
45. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 805-6 (1946).
46. "The outstanding virtue of a system of private enterprise, . . . arises out of a
kind of mutual confidence game. . . . [Ilf there are few enough sellers in the market
to enable each to watch all the others, the play may slow down . . .to the extent that
sellers anticipate each others' reactions and become of one mind, they behave like
one seller, a monopolist. Some uncertainty ...is necessary for effective competition."
Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1299,
1329-30 (1948); see MILE a at 186-7 (1941). On "uncertainty" in the theory of oligopoly,
see CHAMBERLIN, Op. cit. supra note 19, at 51-5.
47. "A strong alert buyer, large enough so that the loss of his patronage is sot
a matter of indifference, constantly on the watch for a break which he can exploit by
rolling up the whole price front, able to force concessions first from one then from
all, and followed by other buyers, can collapse a structure of control or keep it from
ever coming into existence." Adelman, supra note 46, at 1300, 1331-2; STOcKING & WAT-
xNNs at 328. See note 31 stpra.
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Market Consequences of Fair Trade
Effective resale price maintenance 48 insulates traditional distribution
methods and stable pricing from competitive attack.49 Retailers are mutually
relieved from fears of price competition on the retail level. With retailers'
price competition stifled, pressure on wholesalers to cut costs and prices
ebbs.5 And resale price restrictions restrain potential price cutters on the
wholesale level. For producers, effective Fair Trade cements certainty of
their rivals' price policies and thus seals potential cracks in the mutually bene-
ficial high price wall.51 Moreover, as distributors themselves are freed from
price competition, their direct pressure on producers relaxes in turn. And the
demise of loss-leader merchandising solves another class of manufacturers'
problems.
But benefits to small retailers are not unmixed. Mass retailers, unable
to cut prices on nationally advertised products, may conduct advertis-
ing appeals52 to maintain volumes or push their own private low price brands.53
These techniques are beyond small retailers' reach. Moreover, guaranteed
48. Fair Trade can only flourish where it is superimposed upon a generally non-
competitive production and distribution arrangement. (1) "Bemuse a single price fixed
commodity is subject to the inroads of competitors fixing lower prices, a manufacturer
seldom will establish and enforce a system of vertical prices unless he knows that compet-
ing manufacturers are likewise fixing and enforcing prices at knowm levels." FTC rbro-r
at lxi; 'M.LLER at 259-60; GRL-rHER at 276; EDWARDS, 'MAIN'TAIING CoznLsa'rIo 276
(1949). (2) Small retailers must be well organized to police Fair Trade prices
and whip recalcitrants into line, FTC REPolr at 309; and to push Fair Traded items to
make up volume they may lose in chain stores. Id. at 289, 325. See Id. at 257, GnREaT
at 272. (3) Consumer price consciousness must not be too great or consumers will shift
to non-Fair Traded brands. In the drug trade, where resale price maintenance has met
with the most success, "price appeal is often distinctly secondary . . . the average
consumer is wedded to her favorite brand of face powder by a bond stronger than price."
ZORN & Fm. Ax at 291, 292. Compare FTC REPORT ly, 293.
49. "The essence of resale price maintenance is control of price competition." FTC
REPO~r at Lxi, see 704;GRErnEL at 277; MLLER at 261; EDWARDS, MAINTAInNG Cam-
PETITION 71 (1949).
50. The 10% extra discount allowed by many drug wholesalers to small retailers to
aid them in meeting competition of chains, note 3S supra, was discontinued after Fair
Trade became effective. FTC REPORT at 206-12. Of course retail druggists did not
approve of this "discrimination." Id. at 209-11.
51. See note 46 supra. GErHER at 28; STOCKING & AVATKIms at 322-4. For theo-
retical analysis of manufacturer calculations in fixing Fair Trade prices, see Phillips,
Some Theoretical Considerations Regarding Fair Trade Laws, 3 J. kLmavsyr.o 242
(1938); Hawidns, Further Theoretical Considerations Regarding Fair Trade Laws,
4 J. MARKETING 126 (1939).
52. Even with Fair Trade, "retailers [are] still free to compete in service, credit,
advertising, sales effort, and window and counter display. All these may be just as ruin-
ous forms of competition as price cutting... [I]n the case of some of these ... forms
of competition, the balance of advantage would seem often to lie with the large dealers
and chains." MILER at 261. See Schachtman, Resale Price Mainhenance and the Fair
Trade Laws, 11 U. or PrTT. L. R-Ev. 562, 579-81 (1950).
53. See note 58 infra.
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high retail markups lure new outlets into distribution of Fair Traded items, 4
thus paring all retailers' market shares. And, since wholesale prices are fixed,
Fair Trade blocks retailer receipt of price advantages of modernized distribu-
tion methods.
Fair Trade may also engender new problems for producers. Effective
enforcement requires a distributor organization ready to police and report
price cutters for appropriate action by the manufacturer.m But retailers may
utilize this newly acquired organized power for bludgeoning producers to grant
greater retail percentage markups over invoice cost." Producers may comply
by either lowering invoice cost to retailers or raising the Fair Trade contracts'
minimum retail price. Either course gives retailers a greater share of retail
revenues.57 So long as raised retail prices do not reduce volume proportion-
ately, retailers will gain. Also, Fair Trade induces the growth of large re-
tailers' private brands. When giant distributors can no longer cut prices on
producers' advertised brands, they may push their own private brands in-
stead. 58 In this way, they set a competitive ceiling on fixed resale prices, or,
by underselling fixed-price producers' brands, may actually usurp their share
of the market.59
Finally, Fair Trade hampers successful expansion by small producers.
Price-cutting may be an effective wedge for a producer breaking into
a new market dominated by large, established rivals. But existing distrib-
utors are hostile to intruders' price-cut products.60 And unlike the integrated
54. "[K]nown price levels and guaranteed margins are strong magnets for new enter-
prises." GRETHER at 254-5, 270-1; MILLER at 262; EDWARDS, MAINTAINING CoMIrITON
71 (1949).
55. FTC REPoRT at 166-241.
56. Retail druggists organized to demand a standard 50% markup. FTC R'oRT at
125-37; the previous attempt at this by a retail druggist organization resulted in an
injunction under the Sherman Act. Id. at 36-8. And cf. United States v. Frankfort Distil-
leries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945) (liquor distributors' organization to compel producers to
adopt Fair Trade pricing held violative of Sherman Act).
57. "It need not follow that increases in realized retail margins under resale price
control be entirely at the expense of the consumer, for they'may come out of the margins
of manufacturers and wholesalers. . . ." GR=xrER at 310-11.
58. The fear of just this prompted food trade producers to set extremely low
minimum resale prices. See note 59 infra; GRnrnm at 273.
59. Food manufacturers in fair trading their products tended to set prices at the
level of chain store prices. "This course was adopted to avoid, so far as possible, placing
their price-maintained brands at a disadvantage in price competition with non-price-
maintained brands, antagonizing large distributors and fostering the development by them
of private brands." FTC REPORT at 297. "Manufacturers were exetremely careful
not to establish minimum prices that would provide an opening for a competitor to build
up sales volume at their expense. Id. at 325 259-63.
60. "These smaller manufacturers . . .face something of a dilemma when they con-
sider resale price maintenance. If they do not attempt it they may not be able to obtain
personalized selling attention from the majority of dealers. If they do try it . . .their
larger competitors might then follow them into programs of price control and the basis
of their differential advantage would be lost." GRE H.R at 276, 280.
Ironically, since these are the people most anxious to foster Fair Trade, wholesalers
may be enabled to foster private brands as a result of Fair Trade. Absent resale price
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distributor venturing into private brand production, new entrants must begin
to cultivate a marketing system of their own. National advertising, the other
effective method of entering markets, may be too costly.1 Consequently small
manufacturers' market shares may be frozen, or expanded only by means of
captive production for giant retailers.
SCHWEGMANN AND ITS AFTERMATH
The Schweginann Case
Schwegzann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp.62 came before the Su-
preme Court in 1951. It arose in a factual setting typical for Fair Trade cases.
Calvert and Seagram, manufacturer-distributors of nationally advertised whis-
keys, sold to Louisiana wholesalers.0 3 The wholesalers in turn sold to retailers
such as Schwegmann Brothers. 4  Calvert and Seagram maintained Fair
Trade pricing on their wares and had signed over 100 retailers to the pro-
gram.65 Schwegmann was a non-signer, undercutting Fair Trade prices.C
Calvert and Seagram brought suit in Federal District Court to enjoin
Schwegmann's practices.0 7  Schwegmann urged in defense that the use
of non-signer clauses to bind sellers of goods in interstate commerce
violated the Sherman Act.6 The lower courts rejected Schwegmann's defense
and granted injunctions.0 9
maintenance, wholesalers' private, little known wares could not compete with price cut
national brands. But resale price maintenance may invite wholesaler forays into produc-
tion for their established distribution channels offering high markup but low priced items
for retailers. Id. at 293.
61. STOCiNG & VATKNS at 319.
62. 341 U.S. 384 (1951). The litigants in Schwegsna occupied the same distribu-
tive roles as the Old Dearborn litigants, note 12 supra. For an excellent legal analysis
of the Schwegnmaw; Case, see Rahl, Resale Price Maintenance, State Action, and tse
Antitnist Laws, 46 ILi L. RLv. 349 (1951). See also Rose, Resale Price Maintenance,
3 ,rAND L. R.v. 24 (1949) ; Schachtman, Resale Price Maintenance and the Fair Trade
Laws, 11 U. oF Prrr. L. REv. 562 (1950) ; Comments: 36 Con.nM L. Q. 781 (1951);
64 HAv. L. REv. 1327 (1951); 18 U. oF CH. L. REv. 369 (1951).




67. Id. at 385-6. District Court opinion at CCH TR.Dz Rto. Rut'. '48251 Dzc. 62,641
(E.D. La. 1950).
68. Schwegmann Brothers alleged that:
"The plaintiff's course of conduct in using contracts with certain Louisiana re-
tailers as a basis for fixing the prices of non-contracting Louisiana retailers
violates the Sherman Anti-Trust Act... [plaintiff's] ... course of conduct in at-
tempting to fix resale prices of non-contracting retailers in Louisiana is an integral
part of an integrated price-fixing scheme of transactions affecting interstate com-
merce depending for its success upon activity which affects interstate commerce."
341 U.S. 384 (1951).
Record on Appeal p. 19.
69. Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., Schwegmann Brothers v. Sea-
gram Distillers Corp., 184 F. 2d 11 (5th Cir. 1950). "[Ijn comprehensively and com-
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Before the Supreme Court, however, Schwegmann was successful. The
majority f6und an "interstate marketing agreement" to fix prices, illegal per
se under well worn precedent.70 And state legislation could not give im-
munity to the scheme, absent approval by Congress. 1 Miller-Tydings, accord-
ing to the Court, did not immunize non-signer clauses from the antitrust law;
Miller-Tydings sanctioned only "consensual agreement."1 2 But Calvert's co-
ercion of non-signers was "price fixing by compulsion,"78 violating "the
spirit" of the Miller-Tydings proviso withholding protection from horizontal
price fixing. 74 In the face of a vigorous dissent, the majority felt that Miller-
Tydings legislative history supported their construction."
The reasoning in Schwegmann is unassailable. The Court started with
Miller-Tydings, a federal act which did not "turn over to the'states the handling
of the whole problem of resale price maintenance."' 0 The Sherman Act pro-
nounced basic congressional policy for interstate distribution of goods:71
Miller-Tydings granted only "a limited immunity" from this policy.18 And
pletely removing from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act price maintenance contracts
which are valid according to the law of a state the amendment removed every prohibition
from or impediment in the way of, the enactment by the states of Fair Trade laws, bind-
ing alike upon signers and non-signers... . This being so, it is wholly immaterial whether
the members of the Congress as a whole or particular members ... did or did not have
in mind ... the specific intent that the amendment should be effective as well against non-
signers as against signers." Id. at 15.
70. 341 U.S. 384, 386. The cases cited were United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (program to stabilize price floor) ; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (maximum price fixing); Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (resale price maintenance).
71. "The fact that a state authorizes the price fixing does not, of course, give im-
munity to the scheme." 341 U.S. 384, 386.
72. Id. at 388.
73. Ibid.
74. "[W]hen retailers are forced to abandon price competition, they are forced into
a compact in violation of the spirit of the proviso which forbids 'horizontal' price fixing."
Id. at 389.
75. Id. at 390-95. Justices Jackson and Minton concurred in the result but objected
strenuously to the detailed examination by the court of legislative history. "(A'side from
a few offices in large cities, the materials of legislative history are not available to the
lawyer." Id. at 396. The language of Miller-Tydings was sufficient to reach the result.
Id. at 394.
Justice Frankfurter dissented and was joined by Justices Black and Burton. They
read the legislative history of Miller-Tydings to validate nonsigner clauses, id. at 397-411.
76. Id. at 388.
77. Id. at 395. "We could conclude that Congress carved out the vast exception now
claimed only if we were willing to assume that it took a devious route and yet failed to
make its purpose plain." Ibid.
78. Id. at 388. For an example of this limited immunity, see United States v. Univis
Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942) (producers may not impose resale restrictions when dis.
tributors alter the product; here distributors ground lenses from blanks furnished by
the producer). But see Guerlain, Inc. v. Woolworth Co., 297 N.Y. 11, 74 N.E. 2d 217
(1947) (rebottling perfume into smaller units not held sufficient change in product).
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Schwegmann affirms that any marketing arrangement in violation of the Sher-
man Act, not specifically immunized by Congress, remains illegal and unen-
forceable.
But the Supreme Court stopped short of the ultimate of its lethal logic.
When a producer by contract vertically fixes identical prices with more than
one distributor, the market effects are no different from a horizontal price
fixing scheme by the distributors themselves.79 And horizontal price-fixing,
expressly excluded from MIiller-Tydings protection, squarely violates
the Sherman Act.8 0 Since, broadly read, the "horizontal" proviso of 'Miller-
Tydings could not shelter any effective resale price maintenance from Sher-
man Act per se illegality, the Miller-Tydings "horizontal" proviso would dis-
embowel Miller-Tydings itself. The Supreme Court's opinion, however, left
"vertical" resale price fixing doctrinally unscathed.
Other State Practices
Nevertheless the Court's reasoning probably destroys two similar state
Fair Trade practices. Some state statutes, going beyond Miller-Tydings'
literal protection, allow producers to fix absolute-not merely minimum-resale
prices. " ' But absolute prices are at the same time minimum and maximum.
Since the Supreme Court in 1951 held maximum price fixing illegal pcr se
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,82 absolute price-fixing agreements
sanctioned by state law seem illegal as antitrust violations outside the Miller-
Tydings shield. Other state Fair Trade laws do not expressly limit statutory
price-fixing authority to producers of branded goods. Consequently some
state courts permit wholesalers to set retailers' resale prices even without
producers' consent.8 3 Price setting by anyone but the owner of the brand
79. This was early recognized by the Supreme Court. Dr. .Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911): The producer "can fare no better with
its plan of identical contracts than could the dealers themselves if they formed a com-
bination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions, and thus to achieve the same
result, by agreement with each other." Id. at 403. And cf. Shulman, The Fair Trade
Acts and the Law of Restrictive Agreements Affecting Chattels, 49 YAm L J. 607, 621-2
(1940).
80. See cases cited in note 70 supra.
81. The older statutes provide that the "buyer will not resell such commdity except
at the price stipulated by the vendor." (Emphasis added.) E.g., C.. Btsumss A- .D
PRoFEssIoNs CODE § 16902(a) (1) (1951). The newer statutes specify sales at "less than
the minimum price." E.g., CoNN. GEz. STATS. § 6709 (1949). See 2 CCH TRE Rm .
REP. ff 7242.
82. Kiefer-Stevrart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
83. Schenley Products Company v. Franklin Stores Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 100, 199 Ail.
402 (App. Ct 1938) (wholesaler acting on his own fixed minimum resale prices. "[T]o
assert that the contract must be made by or on behalf of the owner of the trade-mark
or brand.. . is to impart into the statute that which is unnecessary to its operation.").
"The other party to the contract, the vendor, need not neccessarily be the producer of
the commodity, or the owner of the trademark, trade name or brand thereof. There need
be no contract to which a wholesaler is a party. The statute is stniicientll broad to is-
clude any contract made by any owner with any vendee." Parrott & Co. v. Sumerset
House Inc., 2 CCH TPUDE REG. REP. qT 7176 (Cal. Super. 1937).
The later statutes, following the NARD model, specifically limit the power to establish
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may fall outside Miller-Tydings literal protection,8 4 and thus violate the
Sherman Act under the doctrine of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park
and Sons, decided by the Supreme Court in 1911.8r And when one whole-
saler, even with the producer's authorization, fixes resale prices on two or
more competing products sold by him, he factually achieves the "horizontal"
effects 86 outlawed by Schwegmann logic.
"Intrastate" Resale Price Maintenance
In any event, however, Schwegrnann's effects can coextend only with the
Sherman Act's reach into local commerce. Where a producer signs Fair
Trade contracts with retailers in other states and himself enforces observance
of the fixed prices, the price-fixed goods move in interstate commerce. Inter-
state effects are obvious and clearly within the interstate commerce scope of
the Sherman Act.87 And a break in the flow of goods, by layover in local
wholesale houses from which sales to retailers are made, does not alter the
legal consequences. Courts thus have followed Schwegmann's lead by denying
enforcement against non-signers because of the "interstate character" of the
producers' commerce.8 Even when the suing producer contracts with distri-
resale prices to the owner of the trade-mark, brand or name used in connection with such
commodity or by a distributor specifically authorized to establish such price by the
owner." CoisN. GEN. STAT. § 6711 (1949). See 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 17178. That
an exclusive territory wholesaler becomes automatically an "authorized" distributor, see
Continental Distilling Company v. Famous Wines and Liquors, 274 App. Div. 713, 80
N.Y.S. 2d 62 (1st Dep't 1948).
84. See statutory text, note 14 supra.
85. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
86. See discussions in Notes, 52 HARv. L. Rav. 284, 288 (1938); 36 Coan. L. Q.
781, 793 (1951). The effect of permitting wholesalers to fix prices on competing lines
will vary with the strength of the competition the wholesaler meets within his territory.
If he is an exclusive territorial agent on all lines he can dictate retail prices on compet-
ing products. But to the extent that competing wholesalers exist, the wholesaler attempt-
ing to fix resale prices may be blocked by competitive activity on their part.
87. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); Sunbeam
Corp. v. Civil Service Employees Co-operative Ass'n, 192 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 20 U.S.L. WEEK 3178 (U.S. Jan. 3, 1952); Sunbeam Corp, v. Wentling,
192 F. 2d 7 (3d Cir. 1951); Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Roberts, 233 P. 2d 258 (Ore.
1951); Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc., 54 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1951); Cal-
vert Distillers' Corp. v. Sachs, 48 N.W. 2d 531 (Minn. 1951).
88. See note 87 supra. All cases involved layovers of the goods in local warehouses.
In Sunbeam Corp. v. Civil Service Employees Co-operative Ass'n, 192 F.2d 572 (3d Cir,
1951), cert. denied, 20 U.S.L. WEEK 317A (U.S. Jan. 3, 1952) plaintiff argued "[T] hat even
if the goods come from without the state, when they have come to rest here they are no
longer in interstate commerce. . . ." But for the court, "[o]ne of the troubles with this
argument [was] that it is directly contrary to the result reached by the Supreme Court
in Schwegmann. . . ." 192 F.2d 572, 573. "It is the interstate character of Sunbeam's com-
merce that is crucial and governing. . . ." Ibid. See also Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340
U.S. 231, 237-8 (1951), where the Supreme Court disposed of a similar argument, tinder
the apparently narrower interstate reach of the Robinson-Patman Act.
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butors in his own state, courts have found sufficient interstate effects to
invoke the Sherman Act, since the producer had shipped goods to other
states as well.8 9 Success in local resale price fixing was held to affect
price policies in other states, with the requisite effects on interstate com-
merce.9 And despite early contrary belief,9' the Sherman Act today may
well reach producers whose entire output is locally sold. Fixed local prices
inevitably influence the price-fixing.producer's out-of-state competitors' price
policies for the local market.92 And a local price fixing arrangement neces-
sarily determines the producer's flow of purchases from other states.03 When
wholesalers set the resale prices, independently or at the producer's direction,
the Sherman Act under similar reasoning should reach them as well.
Where resale price-fixing contracts consummated by producers are left
to enforcement by local retailers, decisions have been inconsistent. Although
economic consequences to Fair Trade producers are unrelated to the distri-
butive function of the enforcers, some courts have permitted local retailers
to enforce Fair Trade against local price-cutting non-signers, on the simple
ground that no interstate commerce was involved.94 But even here one case
apparently limited local retailers' enforcement against non-signers to instances
where the contracting manufacturer operated within the local state, though
he also sold to other states.
9 5
89. Cal-Dak Company v. Say-On Drugs Inc., CCH TRADE REG. RnP. '4S-'51 Dec.
162,904 (Cal. Super. 1951); Buloa Watch Co. Inc. v. S. Klein On the Square, Inc.,
199 Misc. 818, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 175 (Sup. Ct. 1951). Cf. Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's
Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., CCH TMDE REG. REP. '4V-49 Dec. 162,905 (Mich. Cir.
Ct 1951) (all commerce involved assumed to be intrastate, but non-signer clause in-
validated on due process grounds), compare note 12 supra.
90. "In the case at bar the success or failure of plaintiff's -ales in California un-
questionably affect plaintiff's ability to continue to sell its products in other states and
therefore affect interstate commerce." Cal-Dak Company v. Say-On Drugs Inc., CCH
TRaDe RnG. R.E. '48-'51 DEc. ff 62,904 at page 64,739 (Cal. Super. 1951).
91. See ZoRN & FELm.AN at 309-10; Martin, The Fair Trade Act, 5 Form. L. REV.
50, 56-7 (1936). Notes 36 CoL L. REv. 293, 303-5 (1936); 6 GEmo. WVAsE. L REv. 110,
114 (1937).
92. See notes 96, 97 infra. Fair Trade price fixing by local producers undoubtedly
affects interstate commerce under economic analysis. If high prices are fixed, non-Fir-
Traded items will flow into the state from outside to grasp the competitive advantage.
If low prices are fixed, a greater volume of local production will be sold.
93. Cf. Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314-15 (1949);
see Rahl, Resale Price 'laintenance, State Action, and the Anti-trust Laws, 46 I.Lt. L
REv. 349, 381 (1951).
94. Rothbaum v. R. H. Macy and Co., Inc., 199 Mis- 890, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 63S (Sup.
Ct. 1951) (local retailer permitted to enjoin non-signer Macy's from selling below Fair
Trade price on items produced in New York; business involved held "intrastate in
character") ; Jacobson Bros. v. E.xquisite Footwear Inc., 199 Misc. &70, 105 N.Y.S. 2d
520 (Sup. Ct 1951).
95. Rothbaum v. R. H. Macy and Co., Inc., CCH TRwE REG. REP. '4-'49 Dec.
f162,844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951) (motion for contempt by violating injunction dismissed
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Since Congress in passing the Sherman Act "left no area of its constitu-
tional power unoccupied,"' G geographical limits for use of non-signer and
other state Fair Trade provisions should be set by the outermost fringes of
the Commerce Clause. Any marketing arrangement affecting interstate com-
merce should be challengeable under the Sherman Act.97 Because the anti-
trust laws aim to establish a nationwide uniform rule of economic conduct,
economic effects upon interstate commerce must guide decisions.
Resale Price Maintenance Enforcement by Refusals to Sell "
Although a producer's freezing of price-cutting non-signers from supplies
could enforce Fair Trade pricing, refusals to sell are subject to economic and
legal risks. A monopolist producer can effectively withhold supplies.00 And
while organized small producers may attain the same result, individual pro-
ducers' isolated refusals to sell may lose markets to competitors.100 Moreover,
many producers cannot afford to isolate themselves from large mass distribu-
tion outlets.1 0 ' And refusals to deal are open to antitrust attack.
Individual producers' refusal to sell is most likely to escape antitrust prose-
cution. Where not held part of an attempt to monopolize,10 2 refusals by
because of plaintiff's failure to show that the price cut articles were "manufactured, pro-
duced and sold to plaintiff and defendant within the State of New York"; though the
court had "the distinct impression that the defendant has thumbed its corporate nose at
the order.").
96. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 ,298 (1945). Cf. Apex
Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United
States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932).
97. "[G]iven a restraint of the type forbidden by the Act, though arising in the
course of intrastate or local activities, and a showing of actual or threatened effect upon
interstate commerce, the vital question becomes whether the effect is sufficiently sub-
stantial and adverse to Congress' paramount -policy declared in the Act's terms.. "
Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234 (1948)
(California refiners held to violate Sherman Act by combining to rig purchasing of
California-grown beets which they refined into sugar and then moved into interstate
commerce in competition with other sugar). The reach of Mandeville Islands into local
commerce is apparent from its frequent citation of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) (regulation of farmer's production of wheat for personal consumption held with-
in congressional power under the Commerce Clause. "[A]ctivities may be regulated
where no part of the product is intended for interstate commerce." Id. at 120. "Sub-
stantial economic effects" the ultimate test, id. at 125).
98. See Comment, Refusals to Sell and Public Control of Competition, 58 YALE L,
3. 1121 (1949); Timberg, The Rights of Customer-Seller Selection, CCH AWnriusT
LAW SYmposlum 151 (1951).
99. See Comment, 58 YALE L. J. 1121 (1949).
100. Id. at 1124; STOCKING & WATKINS at 327-28.
101. STOCKING & WATI Ns at 328-30.
102. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (refusal by sole
newspaper in community to accept advertising from local radio station advertisers held
attempt to monopolize) ; Eastman Kodak Co. of N.Y. v. Southern Photo Materials, 273
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individual producers may not incur illegality; in fact the right of customer
selection is expressly guaranteed in the Clayton Act. 1 3 The Colgate case 104
represents the general rule, exempting from antitrust illegality individual
refusals to sell, even when made for the purpose of securing adherence to
the producers "suggested" resale prices. But the Supreme Court's subsequent
Beech-Nut decision 105 cut down Colga!e's exemption, by outlawing as unfair
methods of competition a series of devices most effective for preventing re-
tailers from straying from producer-dictated resale prices. 10  And Bausch
& Lomb,107 decided by the Court in 1944, apparently limited Colgate's pro-
tection of boycott enforcement of resale price maintenance to systems based
on distributor's "mere acquiescence," and not requiring their active coopera-
tion "08-such as recommending cooperative "ethical" retailers or ferreting out
price cutters. Thus Beech-Nut and its sequels were assumed to cripple
Colgate, 0 9 and enforceable non-signer Fair Trade delayed renewed judicial
test.
U.S. 359 (1927) (refusal to supply retailer after acquisition of competing retail outlet
held attempt to monopolize) ; United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp.
32 (D. Minn. 1945) (manufacturer's refusal to supply distributor who underbid him
on government contract held attempt to monopolize) ; Cf. United States Y. International
Salt Co. 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (manufacturer's tie-in sales held violation of § 3 of Clay-
ton Act).
103. "[N]othing contained in... this title shall prevent persons engaged in selling
goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona
fide transactions and not in restraint of trade." 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1946).
104. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
"In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not
restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely pri-
vate business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom
he will deal; and, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which
he will refuse to sell." Id. at 307.
105. FTC v. Beechnut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) ("[A) trader is not guilty
of violating [the Sherman Act] who simply refuses to sell to others.... He may not...
go beyond the exercise of his right, and by contracts or combinations, express or implied,
unduly hinder or obstruct the free and natural flow of commerce in the channels of in-
terstate trade."). Id. at 452.
106. The practices outlawed by the Supreme Court were:
(1) receiving information from distributors as to the identity of price cutters; (2)
maintaining blacklists of price cutters; (3) employing agents to gather information about
price cutters; (4) utilizing symbols and tracers to track the flow of goods to price
cutters; (5) utilizing any cooperative means to enforce resale prices. Id. at 455-56.
107. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
108. Id. at 721-23.
109. See Comment, 58 YALE L. J. 1121, 1128-29 (1949).
In oral argument before the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil (Thdiana) case, where
the FTC had incongruously relied on the Colgate case, Justice Frankfurter thought that
case "rather under a cloud." 18 U.S.L. NVzrm 3211 (Jan .17, 1950). For full discussion,
see Rowe, note 24 supra at 942-45, 965-72.
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Schwegmnann's holding requires resurrection of Colgate for legal Fair Trade
enforcement by refusals to supply price-cutters; the rebirth has already begun.
The Supreme Court's recent dictum in Kiefer-Stewart v. Seagram and Sons
110
sets the pace. Seagram and Calvert, though under joint control, were found
guilty of conspiring to enforce, by refusal to sell, maximum resale prices.111
But the Court significantly went on to add that "Seagram and Calvert, acting
individually, perhaps might have refused to deal.""12 The Second Circuit in
Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge Distributing Co."83 apparently took the
hint. There a wholesaler contracted to buy foreign whiskeys from a dis-
tributor, on condition that the distributor maintain resale prices. Upon the
distributor's failure to maintain prices the court permitted the wholesaler to
rescind, though the distributor claimed that antitrust law voided the resale
price maintenance stipulation in the contract. The Second Circuit's holding that
Miller-Tydings legalized resale price maintenance on imported products 114
could have fully disposed of the case. But the court went on (though Schweg-
mann had been decided ten days before) to advise 11 of "legitimate means
of price maintenance in spite of . . . the Sherman Act .. .such [as] . . .
a refusal to sell in the future to those who had not maintained a suggested
price e.g., United States v. Colgate & -Co. . ."116 And it distinguished
Kiefer-Stewart because there "competitors agreed on a price to be
fixed. 11 7 Again, in the present term, the Supreme Court in Lorain
Journal Co. v. United States specifically cited Colgate with approval, 118
though carefully distinguishing it from the facts at issue. 1
A more recent lower court opinion, Cat's Paw Rubber Co., Inc., v. Barlo
Leather and Findings Co., Inc.120 apparently adds to Colgate a further twist.
Improving on Colgate's system, Cat's Paw by contract also bound its distrib-
utors not to sell to non-signers. When defendant non-signer purchased Cat's
Paw products from a contracting distributor, Cat's Paw sued for inducing
110. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
111. Id. at 215.
112. Id. at 214.
113. 189 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1951).
114. Id. at 916. The Wilson Tariff Act of 1894, 28 STAT. 570 (1894), 15 U.S.C. § 8
et seq. (1946) mirroring section 1 of the Sherman Act attempts to destroy restraints of
trade in imports into the United States. Miller-Tydings, which mentions the Sherman
and FTC Acts specifically, makes no mention of the Wilson Act. The Court read the
amendment into the Tariff Act. 189 F.2d 913, 916. At this point the agreement between
plaintiff and defendant became enforceable, and the court need have gone no further.
115. Judge Frank in dissent charged his colleagues with setting a precedent that
"breathes new life into the remains of the decrepit doctrine of United States v. Colgate
and Co. .. ." Id. at 917.
116. Id. at 916.
117. Ibid.
118. 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951).
119. Ibid.
120. CCH TRADE RE. REP. '48'51 DEc. 1162,949 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
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breach of the Fair Trade contract provision. The court, without citing anti-
trust precedent, awarded damages to plaintiff, holding Schwegman inap-
plicable.'l
But Cat's Paw squarely treads on prior cases. In 1911, on practically
identical facts the Supreme Court's Dr. Miles decision - denied judicial pro-
tection to a resale-price fixing manufacturer in his suit against a non-signer
who bought from Miles' distributors contractually barred from non-signer
sales. Although Miller-Tydings legalized contractual resale price maintenance,
found by Dr. Miles to be in restraint of trade and thus violating the Sherman
Act, Congress probably did not thereby intend to sanction the entire enforce-
ment system condemned in Dr. Miles. Since Beech-Nut and Bausch & Lomb
outlaw producers' tight policing, alone or in cooperation with middlemen, of
straying retailers, a producer's action in contractually forcing his distributors
to assume the policing function through refusals to sell should be doubly bad.
And by enforcing the refusal to sell contracts, courts themselves actually
effectuate the policing arrangement.
Moreover, since MIiller-Tydings shields nothing but vertical resale price
maintenance contracts, 3 a contractual vertical integration walling off com-
petitors from supplies could be held illegal under recent Sherman Act doc-
trines as unreasonably narrowing the market for the distribution of the con-
tracting producer's goods.- 214 And when producer and distributor agree to
freeze out all non-signers on the distributive level, the competitors of the
contracting distributors are coerced to sell at the Fair Trade price or not at
all. Since some distributors thus must abandon competition for the benefit of
others, the "horizontal compulsion" banned by Schweg; ann is achieved by a
circuitous route. And when a series of distributors identically contracts with
the producer to bind him from selling to their competitors, their parallel
action may give rise to an inference of conspiracy on their part.225
Recent expansion of Sherman Act conspiracy doctrines '-6 may effectively
thwart producers' attempts to stabilize resale prices through refusals to deal.
Concerted boycotts by powerful groups occupying strategic market sectors
121. Ibid. Cf. Sunbeam Corp. v. Nossoff, CCH TnA- Rr. RE. '43-'51 Dec.
162,943 (Cal. Super. 1951) (damage avard and permanent injunction for breach of
Fair Trade agreement; no examination into legality of the contract nor citation of legal
precedent). All state Fair Trade statutes authorize contracts stipulating for refusals to
sell to non-signers. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 6709 (1949) ; CALu. BusWEmss AMD PROMs-
SIONS CODE. § 16902 (1950).
122. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
123. Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
124. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); cf. Standard Oil of
Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
125. See text discussion at pages 401-3 infra.
126. See, generally, Comment, Conscious Parallelinn-Fact or Fancy, 3 STAN. L
Rxv. 679 (1951); Note, Are Two or More Persons INeccssary to Have a Conspiracy
wuder Section 1 of the Shcrman Act? 43 ILL. L. REv. 551 (1948); cf. Kittelle & Lamb,
The Implied Conspiracy Doctrine and Delivered Pricing, 15 LAw & CoNrms,. Pno. 227
(1950).
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have long been held illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.127 And the
Supreme Court has struck down an organized retailer group's refusal to buy,
aimed at forcing the producer to institute Fair Trade pricing.
128 Conversely,
independent producers' organized boycott to compel distributors to toe the
resale price line probably could not stand. The Supreme Court in fact has
branded as an illegal "conspiracy" two corporate affiliates' intramural refusal
to deal with distributors not adhering to the sellers' dictated price policy.
120
From this "bathtub conspiracy" concept,130 only a short leap in logic can
condemn as an illegal conspiracy, among members of the board of directors,
even a single corporation's refusal to deal.' 3 '
Finally, a single producer with little power in the market cannot benefit
long from his refusal to deal unless his competitors, too, refrain from sales.
Therefore courts may look beyond the individual refusal, examine the reaction
of business competitors who refuse to sell, and infer from the "conscious
parallel" action of them all a conspiracy 132 to boycott, violating the Sherman
127. Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); United States v.
Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945) ; Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers
Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). Cf. Associated Press v. United States 326
U.S. 1 (1945). See generally Comment, 58 YALE L. J. 1121 (1949) ; Kirkpatrick, Cool.
inercial Boycotts as per se Violations of the Sherman Act, 10 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 302,
387 (1942).
128. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
129. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
130. Aside from Kiefer-Stewart, the intramural conspiracy concept, fitting illegal
activity by corporations under single central control into the Sherman Act § 1 com-
bination requirement, has -ecently been used in United States v. General Motors. Corp.,
121 F. 2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941) ("conspiracy" between GM and its wholly-owned financ-
ing subsidiary); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) ("conspiracy"
between affiliated corporations) ; Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S.
110 (1948) ("conspiracy" among parent and 5 subsidiary corporations).
131. "The complaint alleged that the corporation together ivith four of its officials,
was engaging in a combination and conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce in
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and in a combination and conspiracy to
monopolize such commerce in violation of § 2..." Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,
342 U.S. 143, 145 (1951) (emphasis added).
132. Cf. Milgram v. Loew's Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951) (injury finding of
conspiracy based only on uniform response of unaffiliated competitors upheld; holding
may have been bolstered by defendants' "past proclivity" to unlawful conduct, as shown
by the decision in the Paranmount case, 334 U.S. 131 (1948) ; see the court's reference,
192 F.2d 579 584); Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F.2d 738 (3d Cir.
1945) ("Uniform participation by competitors in a particular system of doing business
where each is aware of the other's activities, the effect of which is restraint of interstate
commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy," shifting the burden of rebut-
tal to defendants. Id. at 743, 745.) Prior cases had upheld inferences of conspiracy from
parallel action. Interstate Circuit Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (but plan
was known to the parties engaging in parallel action) ; American Tobacco Company v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (parallel price movements in cigarette sales, parallel
buying practices in leaf market); cf. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948)
(concerted maintenance of basing point system). See Rostow, The New Shernanl Act:
A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. OF Cm. L. REV. 567, 580-6 (1947).
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Act. Since courts may insist that only an individual's action taken with com-
petitive business judgment can rebut such an inference of conspiracy, 13a
refusals to deal aimed at price stabilization stand small chance of successful
rebuttal.
CONCLUSION
The Schwegnmt Case, unless overruled by Congress, may have destroyed
workable Fair Trade. When non-signer price cutters can obtain supplies, their
price competition forces signing retailers to follow suit or lose their markets.
In this way, the resale price maintenance structure must collapse. And pro-
ducers cannot easily cut off supplies to price cutters. Not only can few producers
afford isolation from substantial markets, but refusals to sell incur ever-greater
legal risks. Under the law today, individual refusals cannot be coupled with
policing or inspection for identifying buyers who can be "safely" supplied.
Group boycotts, long illegal per se, may soon encompass individual refusals col-
lectivized by flourishing conspiracy doctrine. Thus, but for the unlikely una-
nimity of all possible distributive outlets in signing Fair Trade contracts,
Fair Trade must eke out a moribund existence in the shadow of the Sherman
Act.
Congress should not revive Fair Trade. 34 Where effective, Fair Trade
blocks consumers' receipt of modem mass distribution benefits.13- Price
competition on the retail level is stifled; pressures for streamlining distribu-
tion channels are relaxed; established producers' grip on price is strengthened.
In sum, Fair Trade stands in the way of competitive change. Legalized resale
price maintenance, a product of the depression-spurred quest for universal
economic security, could once perhaps have been justified as an emergency
stitch in a rent social fabric. But, in an inflationary economy of full employ-
ment, Congressional policy should focus on reducing high distribution costs.
Congress, therefore, not only should refrain from bolstering Fair Trade; it
should also reexamine other depression-spawned legislation that deadens
competitive reform in distribution and has long outlived its need. Miller-
133. Fanchon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 84 (S.D. Cal.
1951). "[N]o parallelism, conscious or unconscious, can overcome a finding of reason-
ableness.' Id. at 104, See Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363, 366-71 (8th
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 942 (1950) (in criminal case, circumstantial evidence
of conspiracy must "be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion than that of guilt
of the defendants." Id. at 367.).
134. For pending legislation to reinstate the non-signer provisions of Fair Trade,
see Wall Street Journal, Dec 12, 1951, p. 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1952, sec. 3, p. 1,
col. 2. See Release, American Fair Trade Council, Feb. 3, 1952; CCH TRan RYX. REP.
Jan. 31, 1952 p. 4.
135. FTC samplings in Fair Trade and non-Fair Trade areas indicate that the general
level of prices on fair traded items increased. Meanwhile the general price level of similar
non-fair traded items decreased. FTC REPORT at 639-710. See Schachtman, supra note
62, at 580.
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Tydings, Robinson-Patman 136 and State Sales-below-Cost statutes 187 are
tarnished symbols :of another day.138
136. For recent exhaustive and critical analysis of the Robinson-Patman Act, See Rowe,
Price Discrimination, Competition and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Pahtan,
60 YALE L. J. 929 (1951). And see Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust
Laws, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1334-37 (1948) ; Integration and the Outlook for the Future,
CCH ANTITRUST LAW Sy posium 135, 138-40 (1951).
137. For comprehepsive critical treatment of Unfair Practices Acts, consult Com-
ment, Sales Below Cost Prohibitions; Private Price Fixing Under State Law, 57 YALE
L. J. 391 (1948)..See also GRETHFR, PIcE CONTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE LEwILATION
(1939); McAllister, 'Price Control by Law in the United States. A Survey, 4 LAW &
CONTEmP. PROB. 273 41937). Often mirroring the Robinson-Patman Act, the 31 state
statutes bar the sale of goods at less than sellers' cost with intent to injure competitors,
But since intent is usually implied from the result, the effect of the acts is to brand
illegal all sales below "cost." For text of the statutes see 2 CCH TRADE R. RE,. g 8002
et seq.
138. Compare the recent announcement of the Attorney-General: "The Department
of Justice is seriously concerned over reports which have come to its attention concern-
ing alleged violations of the Federal Antitrust laws by concerted efforts on the part of
manufacturers and di-tributors of commodities which move in interstate commerce to
suppress and eliminate competition in the wholesale and retail sale of such commodities.
The decision of the Supreme Court on May 21, 1951, in Schwcgmann Brothers el al v.
Calvert Distillers Corporation holding that attempts to force persons who have not entered
into so-called "Fair Trade" contracts to adhere to or maintain minimum resale prices
are not exempted from the Sherman Act, has apparently given rise to various attempts
to prevent price competition by non-signers.
Those who are engaged in programs or schemes of the following type, involving
dommodities which flow in interstate commerce should know that they may be subject
to criminal .prosecution .agreements among competing retailers to maintain and adhere
to specified minimum prices; agreements to coerce and induce wholesalers or manufac-
turers, throug4i threat .of loycQtt or other reprisals to refrain from selling to price cut-
ting retailers; agreeinhnts to coerce or induce manufacturers or wholesalers to enter into
so-called "Fair-Trddd Cordtracts"; agreements to coerce or force retailers to sign such
contracts; agreementb bn the prices or margins of profits which should be set forth, on
such contracts and 'o" methods to require producers or wholesalers to specify certain
prices or markups in such contracts." Dep't of Justice Release, July 18, 1951, quoted in
2 CCH Tnn .REG. REP. I. 7076.
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